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ABSTRACT  Gender discourse is very influential everywhere, calling to attention the 
unwarranted discrepancy between the locations of men and women in the state and society 
in almost every facet of life. It places particular emphasis on the oppression and marginalisa-
tion of women at all levels. The feminist movements have for years continued to advocate 
for gender balance especially through affirmative action. Yet, only marginal progress has 
been made. Drawing insights from contemporary Nigeria, this paper argues that if the gender 
discourse will ever be productive, it would have to be reoriented and situated within the 
framework of power politics.
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INTRODUCTION
Gender talk, or the discourse on gender, is very influential everywhere. 
Following the declaration of 1975 as the International Women’s Year by 
the United Nations, the attention accorded to gender issues has been on the 
increase. This concern climaxed with the Fourth World Conference on Women 
in 1995 held in Beijing, China, with the theme “Equality, Development and 
Peace”, the aim of which was to review and appraise the achievements of the 
UN Decade for Women from 1975 to 1985 (Akinboye, 2004). The increasing 
attempt to mainstream gender issues not only into academic discourses, but also 
advocacy and public policy domains is understandable. For one, women con-
stitute half of the world’s population and have contributed to human develop-
ment. Their contributions manifest in five key roles, namely, mother, producer, 
home manager, community organiser and social, cultural and political activists 
(Anifowose, 2004; Oyekanmi, 2004; Dauda, 2004). By so being, women have 
been generally seen as positive agents of social change (Olurode, 1990). How-
ever, despite the centrality of women to development, given their demographic 
strength and roles, they are today, as ever, still being treated as the “weaker” 
sex.
The feminist movements, drawn from across academia, civil society/non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs) and public policy decision making domains, 
feed on this discrepancy. The thrust of their talk/advocacy is that there is an 
unwarranted discrimination in the locations of men and women in the state and 
society in every facet of life. They place particular emphasis on the oppres-
sion and marginalisation of women at all levels, politically, economically, and 
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socio-culturally. Recent studies explore the issues of the feminization of poverty 
and domestic violence against women (Davies, 1994; Wallace, 1996; World 
Health Organisation, 1996; Moore, 1979; Therborn, 2004). The rising magni-
tude of domestic violence against women, or what Tenuche (2003) referred 
to as “the burden of marital vows”, with its attendant negative implica-
tions for the reproductive capacity and mental health of women, among oth-
ers, represents a crucial dimension of the feminization of violence (Taylor & 
Stewart, 1991; Tenuche, 2003). These developments have been imputed largely 
to the door steps of certain cultural practices that relegate women to the back-
ground and the low responsiveness of government to these issues.
The struggles to integrate and mainstream gender issues into national politics 
and policies have been the pivot of feminist movements. For decades, feminists 
have continued to advocate for gender balance especially through affirmative 
action, whereby both elective and appointive seats/offices are to be automati-
cally allocated to women. While some progress has been recorded in certain 
respects, such progress appears to be very marginal and of little impact. This 
paper concerns itself with an analysis of the complex relation among gender, 
power and politics in contemporary Nigeria. I argue that the bases of all these 
claims of improved gender equality through affirmative action are faulty, leading 
to the failure/ineffectiveness of policy measures designed so far to address the 
problem. For the gender discourse, or gender talk, to be very meaningful and 
productive, I submit that it has to be situated within the context of power poli-
tics, as a basis for identifying the real problems and designing appropriate rem-
edies. The paper begins by situating gender, power and politics in a theoretical 
context. It then reviews the state of knowledge on gender politics in Nigeria. 
It proceeds to detail the various forms of responses from both the government 
and civil society to the challenges of mainstreaming gender into national poli-
tics and policies, reflecting on the failure and inadequacies of these responses. 
It goes on to illustrate this failure, drawing on insights from contemporary 
Nigerian politics especially since the birth of the nascent democracy in 1999, 
and finally examines the centrality of power politics to the understanding of the 
wide gap between the theory and practice of gender politics in Nigeria, and the 
long term prospects of mainstreaming gender issues into national politics and 
policies.
GENDER, POWER AND POLITICS: A THEORETICAL DISCOURSE
The relationships among gender, power and politics are not only complex 
but also dynamic. Any attempt to sufficiently grasp and grapple with it must 
as a matter of necessity tread with caution, treating each of them as a distinct 
category of analysis in its own right, before a synthesis. The concept of gen-
der typifies not women or men per se, but the ideological and material relation 
between them, which historically has been an unequal relationship. It connotes 
a kind of “socially constructed inequality between women and men”. It also 
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relates to the political, economic and cultural contexts of relations between men 
and women, where the latter are most often subordinated to the former.
The asymmetrical pattern of gender relations constitutes the focus of the 
feminist theorists. Basically, the feminist theory focuses on the distinctions 
between men and women in terms of roles, interests and capabilities. It argues, 
for example, that women are much more versatile than men in handling issues 
such as conflict resolution, negotiation and diplomacy because they possess 
an enhanced capability to bond, form lasting relationships and empathise with 
others. Beyond this role differentiation, some feminists argue for a general 
expansion of women’s participation in public affairs by giving them an equal 
opportunity to compete with their male counterparts. In sum, feminism is of the 
view that the world today is disproportionately and perhaps deliberately skewed 
and rigged by men against women. It therefore seeks to advance women, 
women’s interests and perspectives, and to correct gender inequalities (Grant & 
Newland, 1991: Chapter 9). Obviously, these arguments are persuasive and sup-
ported by reality. Yet, their greatest limitation, as articulated by the critics of 
the feminist theory, is that they risk “reinforcing the same gender stereotyping 
they are trying to overcome” (Grant & Newland, 1991: 511).
Morgenthau is famous for his political realism. His analysis is anchored on 
the concept of power, which according to him, is nothing more than the control 
of man over man. It is the ability of one to control the minds and actions of 
others (Morgenthau, 1978: 9). Following this tradition, Barry defined power as “the 
ability to get people to do what you want them to do or to refrain from doing 
things you do not want them to do” (Barry, 2003: 323). Or, power is “the abil-
ity to get people to do things” (Barry, 2002: 162-163). This realistic conception 
of power has, however, not gone unchallenged. Tickner (1991, 1988) contended 
that by relying heavily on assumptions about human nature, political realism 
was not only partial but also masculine in approach, in her feminist reformula-
tion of Morgenthau’s principles of political realism, which she summarized to 
include its emphasis on rationality and objectivity, human nature and interest, 
the tension between morality and the requirement of successful political action, 
and the autonomy of the political sphere. Whereas, masculinity and feminin-
ity refer to “a set of socially constructed categories that vary in time and space 
rather than to biological determinants” (Tickner, 1991: 23, 1988). This think-
ing has been dominant among feminist scholars. For example, Hannah Arendt 
defined power as “the human ability to act in connection with others who 
share similar concerns” (Tickner, 1991). This definition, according to Tickner, 
is coterminous with that of McClelland which described female power as “shared 
rather than assertive” (Tickner, 1991: 26). With this reformulation, the concept 
of power would appear to have fallen prey to what Dowding called “linguistic 
oddities”, not as useful in making important causal and therefore normative dis-
tinctions (Dowding, 2003: 309).
Be that as it may, power remains central to the understanding of gender dis-
course. As we may have known, power is at the very heart of politics. And 
given the pertinence of power as “resources”, any means of acquiring it, in 
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the Machiavellian tradition, is justifiable. Whatever the motivation for seeking 
power, be it personal, collective or psychological ends, it is doubtful whether 
any holder(s) of power will voluntarily relinquish it, for whatever reason. It is 
the power seekers who have the responsibility to struggle to acquire it at all 
cost, for the whole essence of politics is the struggle for power whereby the 
“ends justify the means.” When power is not captured or won, but allocated 
on a compensatory and/or emotional/sentimental basis as is the case in affirma-
tive action, the tendencies are that such power can easily be circumvented to 
denude it of autonomy and effect. Such power is therefore qualified and may 
not be able to advance the purposes for which it was sought. Rather, it may be 
perverted and used to advance some hidden agenda of the “benevolent” leader 
who apportioned it in the first instance. This perception can be gleaned from 
the debate between Dowding and Barry over the relationship among resources, 
power and systematic luck (Dowding, 1991, 1996, 2003; Barry, 2002, 2003). 
This is also supported by reality, as exemplified by the Ugandan experience 
under Yoweri Kaguta Museveni’s government where what the women gained on 
the one hand with the increase in the numbers of women in public represen-
tative office through affirmative action measures, they lost on the other in the 
compromised women’s political effectiveness and autonomy (Tripp, 2001; Goetz, 
2002). 
The Ugandan experience under Yoweri Kaguta Museveni’s government shows 
that actually, feminist movements recorded significant and widely acclaimed 
improvement in political representation. This was made possible through the 
creation and reservation of new seats in national and local government for 
women, and through a principle of affirmative action in administrative appoint-
ments. It was so resounding that in the June 2001 parliamentary elections, down 
through all five tiers of local government, nearly 25% of members of parlia-
ment became women and averaged 30% of representation among local council-
lors (Goetz, 2002: 541-550).
But as it turned out, what the women gained with the right hand, they lost 
with the left. Goetz (2002) documented in great detail how the strategy of affir-
mative action, which he described as the “relatively non-democratic means of 
women’s access to power through reservations”, produced some unintended con-
sequences and ensured mortgaging the “intended” benefits. Among such conse-
quences, the strategy helped to legitimize what he called Museveni’s “benevo-
lent autocracy”, epitomised mainly by his no-party democracy. With respect to 
the latter, the strategy did not only weaken, but eroded women’s legitimacy and 
effectiveness in policy-making. In the long run, the individual occupants of such 
seats and the government benefited, not women as a collectivity. In effect, the 
development did not “threaten incumbent politicians or male aspirants”, just as 
it did not “challenge entrenched interest” by suggesting that women as a group 
may have a set of interests to represent which may change the policy orienta-
tion and beneficiaries of these institutions.” This is because, as Goetz (2002: 
559) put it, “it is their gender, not their politics, that is their admission ticket.” 
Analysing the Ugandan experience from a different perspective, Tripp empha-
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sized the centrality of associational autonomy to the success of any organisa-
tion. While the women in the Museveni’s government were able to maintain 
some level of autonomy, their co-optation served to limit their autonomy and 
effectiveness in decision-making (Tripp, 2001). The message and lesson to be 
learned, to borrow the expression of Goetz (2002: 549), is that there are “no 
shortcuts to power”.
THE STATE OF THE STUDY
In recent years, gender studies have gained increasing recognition and atten-
tion in Nigeria (Olurode, 1990; Adesina, 1991; Ayoade et al., 1992; Uchendu, 
1995; Awe, 1996; Obi, 2001). The general consensus that runs through these 
studies is that women have always been treated as the weaker sex, marginal-
ized, oppressed and alienated. These deprivations manifest in diverse forms, 
including the political, economic and socio-cultural dimensions. Politically, it 
has been argued that women are not only underrepresented, but also victims of 
repressive public policies and political violence. Economically, women are said 
to have been discriminated against, particularly in terms of employment in the 
economy due to the occupational structure of employed persons, access to land, 
credit facilities and other financial resources, and as victims of poverty. On the 
socio-cultural front, women are known to have suffered no better fate. Gender 
differences have been identified in the development of human health capital in 
Nigeria. For instance, men reportedly fare better than women in terms of life 
expectancy at birth, total fertility rate, etc. Studies now speak about the femini-
zation of the HIV/AIDS infection in Nigeria. With respect to education, women 
are also under-privileged, coming second far behind their male counterparts 
in terms of adult literacy level, primary and secondary school enrolment, and 
record high rate of primary school dropouts (Dauda, 2004; Oyekanmi, 2004; 
Lewu, 2005; Ako-Nai, 2005; Bruce, 2005; Adereti, 2005).
The political marginalization of women in Nigeria was well played out dur-
ing the First Republic (1960-1966) when there were only two female legisla-
tors, Mrs. Wuraola Esan and Mrs. Bernice Kerry in the federal parliament, and 
two others, Mrs. Margaret Ekpo and Mrs. Janet Muokelu in the Eastern House 
of Assembly. There was no female minister. During the Second Republic, there 
was one female senator out of 571, and 11 members of the House of Repre-
sentatives out of 445. In the 19 states of the federation, there was no female 
representation in all the State Houses of Assembly, neither was there a female 
chairperson nor councillor at the local government level (Agina-Ude, 2003: 3). 
Under the infamous transition programme of General Babangida, the longest and 
most expensive in Nigeria (1985-1993), women were also grossly alienated. For 
instance, in the 19-member Political Bureau of 1986, only two were women. In 
the 1990 local government elections, 3 women were elected out of 591. In the 
State Houses of Assembly, there were 27 out of 1172 members, where there 
was no women legislator in 14 States. In the House of Representatives, women 
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counted 14 out of 589, and 1 out of 91 in the Senate. Of the 3000 presidential 
aspirants in 1991, only 8 were women (Agina-Ude, 2003: 3-4). At the politi-
cal party level, the trend was the same. In the Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
for example, there were 23,020 (96%) men in executive positions at national 
and state levels, compared to 958 (4%) for female. In the National Republic 
Convention (NRC), men accounted for 19,464 (99.57%) of the executive posi-
tions, against women’s 85 (0.43%). Men had 42,486 (98.12%) executive posi-
tions, against 816 (1.88%) for women (Adereti, 2005: 521). Under General Sani 
Abacha, there were 20 women out of 360 members of the House of Represen-
tatives, and 9 out of 109 Senators (Ajina-Ude, 2003: 4). On the socio-economic 
front, there is no significant difference. For example, the percentage of women 
in the labour force, which was 35.9% in 1994, stood at 34.3% and 38.1% 
in 1993 and 1994 respectively. Since 1986, the proportion of female primary 
school dropouts are larger (Dauda, 2004).
Several reasons have been advanced for the marginalization of women in 
Nigeria. These include constitutional inadequacies, that no specified provisions 
were made to ensure gender equality, with only a nebulous reference to non-
discrimination on the basis of sex; the general lack of political will on the 
part of Nigerian political leadership and the women; harmful traditional prac-
tices such as humiliating widowhood rites, taboos against acquisition of prop-
erty and exclusion from decision making in the family or community. Among 
other reasons, there are the low level of education of women, political insta-
bility, religion, weak financial base, and the masculine nature of politics, 
which tends to promote and sustain inadequate party interests in women issues 
(Olojede, 1999, 2004; Agina-Ude, 2003; Adeleke, 2004; Adereti, 2005; Lewu, 
2005). Some studies have also stressed the salience of certain historical legacies 
of gender inequality in Nigeria. Of particular importance here is the epochal 
character of colonialism. As Ikpe pointed out, “colonialism did nothing to devi-
ate from the preclusion of women from the public sphere and their limitation 
in the economic sphere. Colonialism itself was a male-dominated venture as all 
colonial officers were male” (Mba, 1982; Ikpe, 2004: 30). The independence of 
Nigeria in 1960 did not change anything, but was a mere change of guards, not 
the substance of governance.
Of all these constraints, the cultural dimensions stand out as the most cru-
cial and therefore deserve some elaboration. Traditionally in Nigeria, women 
are considered to be properties of men. This traditional belief was later to be 
reinforced by the two imported religions, Islam and Christianity, both of which 
preached that women should be submissive to their husbands, the heads of the 
family. For this reason, the society tends to measure a woman’s devotedness to 
God partially in terms of her loyalty and submission to her husband. Within 
this context, women are expected to be home keepers in all ramifications, 
including child rearing. 
Some examples suffice. Among the Yoruba people of South Western Nigeria, 
the wife (Aya) is under traditional obligations to be submissive to the hus-
band (Oko). This is well captured in the Yoruba popular expression, “Oko lolori 
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Aya”, that the husband is the head/master/crown of the wife. The situation is 
not so different among the Igbo of South Eastern Nigeria where women are 
also considered to be the weaker sex. In fact, wives here regard and address 
their husbands as “nnan ukuwu”, meaning “my big master” (Ojo, 2006). The 
situation is worse among the Hausa Fulani of Northern Nigeria. Here, they 
operate what they call “matan kule”, that is purdah, under which women/wives 
are mandated to dress in a flowing gown that totally cover their body, including 
the face. Such women are not even allowed freedom of movement and interac-
tion, as their husbands must not see them outside their homes for whatever rea-
son. The essence of this, they claim, was to checkmate any tendencies towards 
infidelity and promiscuity on the part of women, even when men, not only 
entitled to marry four women, are apparently known to be promiscuous. Conse-
quently, the Nigerian society has become patriarchal where traditional male val-
ues are institutionalised not only in the family, but also in the economic, social 
and religious dimensions. The implication is that the state is perpetually rigged 
against women, with a devastating legacy of inequalities between genders.
OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE
Following the increasing attention accorded to gender discourse, the state and 
society have seemingly been responding to its challenges. In the Nigerian con-
text, I discuss these responses under official and unofficial responses, the former 
being the government’s and the latter, the civil society’s.
I. Government Response
Successive Nigerian governments have responded to the challenges of gender 
politics, most notable being the legal and institutional responses. Legally, Sec-
tion 15 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provides that no one shall be dis-
criminated against on the grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, status and 
ethnic ties (FRN, 1999). Although, the reference to sex here is important, it is 
however not sufficient to guarantee gender equality. Other references to equality 
in the constitution, as in Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution are not categori-
cal, but emphasize masculinity especially in language with the use of “he/his” 
(Agomo, 2004: 93-97).
Another major innovation on the part of the government was the creation 
in 1995 of a separate Ministry of Women Affairs with a cabinet rank minister. 
Since its inauguration in 1999, women have been the occupant of the office, 
with specialisation in the promotion of women issues. Much earlier in 1989, the 
Federal Military Government, in compliance with the United Nation’s directive, 
established the National Commission for Women by Decree 30. The Commis-
sion was to improve the welfare of women in general, to promote responsible 
womanhood and maternal health, stimulate actions that would improve civic, 
political, cultural, economic and educational conditions of women, support the 
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work of NGOs, co-ordinate government and women’s organizations, encourage 
the establishment of co-operative societies, formulate and propagate moral val-
ues within the family units, and work towards the total elimination of all socio-
cultural practices tending to discriminate against and dehumanize womanhood 
(Olojede, 2004: 121-122). Its achievements included the organization of work-
shops on women’s affairs, public enlightenment campaigns, and the production 
of an acceptable national policy document on women’s development.
Other official responses included the initiation of economic empower-
ment strategies for women. Most prominent among such economic empower-
ment measures included the Family Support Programme, anchored by Maryam 
Abacha, wife of the then Head of State, and Better Life for Rural Women 
established in 1987 under the Babangida regime. While each had its spe-
cific objectives, a common denominator was the general concern for women’s 
affairs. Both sought to contribute to the development of the family, strengthen 
the human rights of women, improve health care delivery and the general well-
being of women (Olojede, 2004). These programmes, together with others, were 
said to have enhanced the status of women in Nigeria, despite their shortcom-
ings, particularly their politicization, urban-bias and corrupt dispositions. 
II. Civil Society Responses
The civil society has responded in several ways to complement government 
efforts. Civil society operates through NGOs, which incidentally have witnessed 
explosive growth in number, size and reach. In Nigeria today, there are many 
such women’s organisations working towards enhancing women’s empowerment 
and gender equality. They include Justice, Development and Peace Commission 
(JDPC), Community Partners for Development (CPD), Gender and Development 
Action (GADA), Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA), Federation of 
Muslim Women Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN), and the National Associa-
tion of Women Lawyers (NAWL).
Karunwi has developed a classificatory scheme through which we can appro-
priately view these NGOs. According to her, NGOs in Nigeria can be catego-
rized into four groups: professional groups, activist women’s group, research 
driven groups and women’s religious groups (Karunwi, 2004: 195-199). While 
the professional groups, such as the NAWL, focus on the struggle to empower 
women in their respective professions, the activist women’s groups are con-
cerned with the total emancipation of women and the eradication of any form 
of class inequality and oppression, for example, Women In Nigeria (WIN). 
Research driven groups deal with the research and documentation of activi-
ties of women in gender-related fields, as is the case for Women, Law and 
Development Centre (WLDCN) and the Women Research and Documenta-
tion Centre (WORDOC). Women’s religious group, such as the YWCA and 
FOMWAN, concern themselves with the eradication of harmful traditional 
practices against women (Karunwi, 2004). To these groups, I add women’s 
human rights based groups, such as the Women Trafficking and Child Labour 
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Eradication Foundation (WOTCLEF).
Whatever the leanings, these NGOs have important roles to play in the 
advancement of women’s affairs. Essentially, they are expected to provide ver-
itable platforms for the advancement of gender balance through popular edu-
cation and empowerment, social mobilisation and sensitisation, not only of 
women, but also of the government and the general public, on the need to for-
mulate and implement gender-friendly policies. They are also to champion and 
externalise the gender struggle, linking the local to the global in the gender dis-
course. Such a linkage can only be possible if they effectively build partner-
ships and networks among the local NGOs, harmonise their views and positions 
to articulate alternative perspectives on the way forward. Without any doubt, 
NGOs in Nigeria have been responding positively to these challenges. Groups 
such as the JDPC, CPD, GADA, WOTCLEF, and WORDOC have engaged in 
advocacy, popular sensitisation and mobilisation as well as research and publica-
tion (Karunwi, 2004; Agina-Ude, 2003). These responses, the official and unof-
ficial put together, may have accounted for the marginal improvement in gender 
awareness and discourse in Nigeria today.
NO RESPITE YET: THE CONTEMPORARY REALITY
Despite these responses and attendant progress, there is still a very deep 
and wide gully between theory and practice. It is important to first reflect on 
the marginal improvement in women’s political empowerment in contempo-
rary Nigeria (1999 to date). In General Abdulsalam Abubakar’s transitional pro-
grammes that ushered in the Fourth Republic in 1999, although women repre-
sentation increased, it was however negligible as shown in the Table 1.
Although the above table is self-explanatory, a few comments are necessary. 
Despite the marginal increase, women’s representation still remains unimagin-
ably poor. Also the marginal increase was most noticeable in appointive posi-
tions, that is the Ministerial and Special Advisers, not elective positions such 
as governors, senators, representatives, local government chairman and council-
Position Male Female Total % Female
Minister/Special Adviser 35 9 44 20.5
Speaker 35 1 36 2.8
Governor 36 - 36 0
Deputy Governor 35 1 36 2.8
Local Govt. Chairman 765 9 774 1.2
Councillor 8,667 143 8,810 1.6
State Assembly Member 978 12 990 1.2
Senator 106 3 109 2.8
Representative 349 13 362 3.6
Table 1. Gender and Politics/Decision-Making Political Positions, 1999.
Source: United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) 2000; reproduced in Dauda, 
2004: 84.
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lors. This suggests that the marginal increase may be due largely, if not solely, 
to the implementation of certain affirmative action measures by the President 
in the composition of the federal cabinet. By implication, it can be argued that 
women are yet to fully “penetrate” the core circle of power politics, where the “real” 
things happen. Hence, their seeming powerlessness and gross lack of autonomy.
A major question that readily comes to mind at this juncture is: why has 
there been only marginal improvement, despite the massive responses to the 
challenges of gender politics from both State and society? The answer may not 
differ fundamentally from the forces earlier highlighted, yet, we may need to 
look elsewhere for a better understanding. This can in turn be aided by some 
critical reflections on the limits of affirmative action and appointment, as against 
the election of women into public offices.
BEYOND AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS: THE CENTRALITY OF POWER 
POLITICS
Admittedly, affirmative action may help to improve the situation of women 
in politics. This point is supported by reality. Yet, it presents some dilemmas in 
its implementation, effectiveness and the irony of the fact that it is hardly sup-
ported by reality, especially in the Third World. From comparative experience, 
while affirmative action measures can improve women’s representation in pub-
lic offices, they have some internal contradictions that tend to ambush and neu-
tralize their intended benefits. A worrisome dimension is that the real agenda 
of such measures can be concealed, touting only the good reason to the public, 
particularly women.
The Ugandan experience under Yoweri Kaguta Museveni’s government, as I 
have earlier shown, best illustrated this possibility. 
In a more recent exposition on legislative quotas for women in Africa, Tripp 
(2005: 57) noted that although women became very vocal and active in par-
liamentary debates, they had more difficulty pushing through legislation that 
would provide key supports to women. He illustrated that while women parlia-
mentarians in Uganda were able to insert key gender related provisions into the 
1998 Land Act, they however failed to include the key co-ownership clauses 
into the passage of the 2000 Amendments of the Land Act. This becomes more 
intriguing because given customary practices, the current legislation, according 
to Tripp, provides limited possibilities for women to own land. The inability 
of women parliamentarians in Uganda to effect desirable legislation in the best 
interest of women, in the view of Tripp (2005: 57), stemmed from their mode 
of power acquisition, namely quotas and affirmative action.
The Nigerian experience under the Fourth Republic does not differ substan-
tially from the Ugandan episode. However, there has not yet been a specific 
affirmative action measure geared towards reserving seats for women in parlia-
mentary and local government elections. Yet, the method of co-optation espe-
cially in political appointment has been well played out, giving women 20.5% 
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of Ministerial and Special Advisers’ appointments in 1999. Regrettably, this 
marginal increase has not been able to generate much increase in women’s abil-
ity to promote and influence gender-friendly legislations and policies. It may 
be that due to their non-elective ascension to power, they lack legitimacy or a 
clear-cut constituency among women, political parties and President
Given the foregoing, there is need to refocus beyond affirmative action mea-
sures. It will be preposterous and counter-productive to assume that gender acts 
as a proxy for the political and social values held by an individual (Tamale, 
1999: 77, cited in Goetz, 2002: 559). As the situation stands today, no threat 
or change has been effected in the structure of male domination of politics and 
governance in Nigeria. And unless tactics are changed, it is doubtful whether 
any meaningful progress can be made in mainstreaming gender into national 
politics and policies. More emphasis should be placed on power politics, with-
out necessarily deemphasizing alternative options such as affirmative action. It 
should however be pursued within the framework of competitive politics so that 
the legitimacy, effectiveness and autonomy of women in decision-making will 
not be compromised.
As I noted earlier, the whole essence of politics is the acquisition of power. 
Power, realistically speaking, is central to human existence and survival. To 
envisage its holders to voluntarily relinquish it on the frivolous grounds of 
gender equality may continue for decades, to remain a dream in the pipeline. 
Rather than commit such political suicide, women would gain more if they 
design ways of circumventing all legal, institutional, and procedural devices 
aimed at achieving such. The onus of seeking and actualising a better balance 
rests with the power seekers, in this case the women, who seek to establish 
power equality with men.
There are a number of difficulties in the way of women, mainly economic 
and financial constraints. Yet, there is no denying the fact that they, along with 
feminists, have a responsibility to bear. Power, as a resource, cannot be attained 
on a platter of gold. It has to be fought for. Whatever the odds, women need 
to force their ways into the mainstream of power politics. If it will require 
staking family affairs to enlist the support of men for the struggle, why not? 
This may sound amoral. But power itself is an amoral phenomenon, being the 
most corruptible object. In any case, can one talk about morality in the context 
of Third World politics generally and Nigeria in particular? The reality is that 
from comparative experience, gaining power at the expense of others has never 
been a tea party. The cost has always been and will continue to be very high.
All the same, the struggle should be predicated upon popular education, 
mobilization and sensitization of all and sundry, drawing attention to the plight 
of women in politics, preaching unity of purpose among all gender-based organ-
isations, and intensive lobbying of public policy decision makers and party 
leaders. For affirmative actions to be effective, they must begin with the politi-
cal parties in all their dealings, and promoted through popular, competitive poli-
tics at all levels of national politics.
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CONCLUSION
This article has examined the increasing influence of gender politics in 
Nigeria. Starting from a theoretical standpoint that emphasizes the centrality of 
power politics to the understanding of gender politics, the paper argues that the 
failure of official and unofficial responses to the feminist challenge in Nigeria 
is largely due to the fact that they proceeded from faulty institutional and pro-
cedural devices. After a review of such measures and the attendant marginal 
improvement in women’s political representation in Nigeria, the paper notes 
that there is still a very long way to go in Nigeria. The easiest and fastest 
path is to emphasize power politics, rather than official affirmative actions, in 
advancing gender equality. This is necessary, given the inherent contradictions 
of affirmative actions that tend to hinder its effectiveness and the legitimacy 
and autonomy of women in advancing their own cause, from the experience of 
Uganda under Yoweri Kaguta Museveni.
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